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NOTES
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT LIABILITY "AS A PRIVATE PERSON"
UNDER THE TORT CLAIMS ACT
The recent case of Rayonier v. United States' has focused attention
on a twilight area of United States liability under the Federal Tort
Claims Act.2 The primary question is whether the "governmental-
proprietary" distinction, important in the tort law of municipal corpora-
tions,' is to be employed in interpreting the Tort Claims Act, thereby
precluding liability for torts committed by federal employees in the course
of carrying out activities peculiarly "governmental" in character.
In municipal corporation law, application of the "governmental-
proprietary" distinction affords immunity to the municipality for torts
committed while it is performing activities designated as "governmental,"
such as the operation of schools, fire departments, police departments and
the prevention and cure of disease.4 On the other hand, liability is im-
posed when the tort arises from a "proprietary" activity, such as opera-
tion of water and light plants, management of property used for income
producing purposes, and maintenance of streets, highways, bridges,
sewers and drains.' Considerable conflict exists in the judicial classifica-
tion of particular activities as either "governmental" or "proprietary." 6
The Tort Claims Act provides that the district courts shall have
jurisdiction ". . . under circumstances where the United States, if a pri-
vate person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of
1. 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
2. Act of Aug. 2, 1946, c. 753, 60 STAT. 842 (codified in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.). Hereinafter called the Tort Claims Act.
3. "Municipal corporations are regarded as having a rather curious dual character,
which has given the courts a great deal of difficulty, and has left the law in a tangle
of disagreement and confusion. On the one hand they are subdivisions of the state,
endowed with governmental powers. . . . On the other they are corporate bodies,
capable of much the same acts as private corporations. . . . The law has attempted to
distinguish between the two functions, and to hold that in so far as they represent the
state, in their 'governmental,' 'political,' or 'public' capacity, they share its immunity
from tort liability, while in their 'corporate,' 'private,' or 'proprietary' character they
may be liable." PROSSER, THE LA-w OF TORTS § 109, at 774 (2d ed. 1955).
4. 18 MCQIILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.24 (3d ed. 1950).
5. 18 id. § 53.23.
6. See, e.g., Warp, The Law and Administration of Municipal Tort Liability, 28
VA. L. REv. 360 (1942). For an extensive, scholarly study of the problems involved see
Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L. J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-25), 36 YALE
L. J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-27) ; Borchard, Governmental Responsitbility in Tort, 28 COL. L.
REv. 577, 734 (1928).
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the place where the act or omission occurred," 7 (emphasis added), and
that, "The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this
title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as
a private individual under like circumstances"'8 (emphasis added). The
phrases "private person!" and "in the same manner and to the same extent
as a private individual under like circumstances" give rise to the instant
problem.
Nothing in the legislative history of the Tort Claims Act provides a
guide to ascertain the intended meaning of these phrases? However, two
alternative interpretations are suggested. A literal interpretation of the
phrases suggests that the United States should be liable only when the
substantive tort law of the jurisdiction where the damage occurred pro-
vides a remedy against either a natural person or a private corporation.
On the other hand since nothing in the Act expressly precludes adjudica-
tion of the government's liability according to the tort liabilities and im-
munities of a municipal corporation, the Act could be construed as adopt-
ing such an interpretation. Pursuance of the latter course would neces-
sarily require utilization of the "governmental-proprietary" distinction.
If the measure of United States liability under the Act is literally
coextensive with the liabilities of natural persons or private corporations,
adequate remedies would seemingly be provided to damaged litigants.
Thus, Government undertaking of activities generally performed by pri-
vate persons would impose upon federal employees the standard of care
required of private persons and subject the Government to the same lia-
bilities as are borne by private employers. For example, a federal em-
ployee, acting in the course of his duties, negligently causes an injury
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b) (1952).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1952).
9. The congressional committee reports are of no value in this respect. The Tort
Claims Act was but a small portion of the Legislative Reorganization Act which was
intended "to provide for increased efficiency in the legislative branch of the Govern-
ment." Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, c. 753, 60 STAT. 812. The interest of
Congress was centered upon the provisions dealing with the structural organization and
operation of the House and Senate with the result that the Tort Claims Act received
little attention. What mention there is of the specific provisions in the Tort Claims Act
goes only to the meaning of the "discretionary" exception. See note 80, infra. Other
than this, the most that can be gleaned from committee reports and House and Senate
debates is that Congress intended to rid itself of the overwhelming burden of private
bills and to provide litigants, in the courts, a more rapid and equitable means of prose-
cuting their claims against the Government. There is, therefore, no reason to suggest
that Congress intended to either include or exclude the "governmental-proprietary" dis-
tinction as an interpretative aid to assess liability of the Government under the Tort
Claims Act. See H.R. REP. No. 2428, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1940) ; H.R. REP. No.
2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) ; S. REP. No. 1196, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1942);
H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945). See also State of Maryland v.
United States, 165 F. 2d 869 (4th Cir. 1947) ; Samson v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 406
(S.D. N.Y. 1947).
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while driving a truck. Under this interpretation of the Tort Claims Act
the United States would be liable because substantive tort law pro-
vides a remedy against a private person who employs a negligent truck
driver. But even if the Act was interpreted literally to the effect that
government liability is judged by the tort law applicable to private per-
sons as such, there would still remain a rather large area in which United
States immunity would persist. Private persons ordinarily do not per-
form certain functions, for example, maintain armies, control floods
over vast areas, impose quarantines, provide police protection, fight fires
with an organization of men and equipment established for such a purpose,
construct and maintain lighthouses, maintain bodies for an express pur-
pose of rescuing persons endangered by the seas, and provide landing
directions for airplanes from control towers at airports. Such functions
are peculiarily suited to be carried on by public bodies, and in fact are
almost exclusively performed by them."0 There is no body of private
substantive tort law which has arisen from such sovereign functions that
the courts can utilize to assess United States liability under the Tort
Claims Act. Thus, if liability is imposed upon the United States under
the Tort Claims Act only under circumstances where a private person as
such would be liable, the absence of private activity in the foregoing in-
stances, with the necessarily corresponding lack of private tort law, would
result in United States immunity for negligent injuries arising out of
such activities.
It is in the foregoing types of activity, characterized as "govern-
mental," that the "governmental-proprietary" distinction would attain its
importance if the Tort Claims. Act were to be interpreted to incorporate
the distinction. Application of the "governmental-proprietary" distinc-
tion would afford immunity for activities termed "governmental" and
liability for those termed "proprietary."" Since "governmental" activi-
ties are the types of 'functions where there is no private liability because
private persons do not usually engage in such functions, and "proprie-
tary" activities are those where private liability 'obtains because private
persons do engage in such functions, the ultimate result of application
10. The reason for the exclusively "governmental" character of many such func-
tions and the absence of private activity is undoubtedly due to the small profit which
would be realized from private investment in such undertakings. This was recognized
in Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Company, 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955), affd per
curiam, 350 U.S. 907 (1955), where the court said, "Airports are usually constructed,
maintained and operated by municipalities, probably because the cost of construction is
great and the prospect of financial reward does not attract private capital. But, as far
as we know . . . there was no reason why a private individual or a private corpora-
tion could not construct an airport and operate a control tower manned by its own
operators. . . ." Id. at 74.
11. See note 3 supra.
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of the "governmental-proprietary" distinction to the Tort Claims Act
would impose liability upon the Government in about the same manner
and to about the same extent as would result should the standard ap-
plicable to natural persons be applied to the Act. However, utilization
of the "governmental-proprietary" distinction would add a complicating
factor to the process of adjudication of cases under the Tort Claims Act.
Instead of imposing a blanket immunity for negligence arising out of
"governmental" activities, the courts would focus their attention upon
determining whether a particular activity should be categorized as "gov-
ernmental" or as "proprietary" according to the law of the jurisdiction
where the tort occurred. The states which utilize the distinction 2 have
had little success in developing logical rules and attaining consistent re-
sults.' Thus, application of the "governmental-proprietary" distinction
to the Tort Claims Act would impose upon the federal courts the burden
of administering an extremely complicated and inconsistent body of law.
Analysis of the cases occurring under the Tort Claims Act suggests
that the courts have adopted neither the standard of tort liability applic-
able to private persons as such nor the standard of the "governmental-
proprietary" distinction. Rather, the courts appear to have pursued a
"middle ground" in interpreting the Act and assessed liability against
the United States for negligent performance of "governmental" activities
notwithstanding the absence of comparable private tort liability and with-
out recourse to the "governmental-proprietary" distinction. This "middle
ground" seems to result from judicial speculation as to what activities
private persons could reasonably perform and a hypothesization of their
liabilities should they engage in such activities. The validity of this
proposition will be examined in light of a series of four Supreme Court
decisions which have given rise to much of the controversy: Dalehite v.
United States," Feres v. United States, 5 Indian Towing v. United
12. The "governmental-proprietary" distinction is applied in every state except
Florida and South Carolina. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 109, at 775 (2d ed. 1955).
13. "Thus the governmental-proprietary rule often produces legalistic distinctions
that have only remote relationship to the fundamental considerations of municipal tort
responsibility. It does not seem good policy to permit the chance that a school building
may or may not be producing a rental income at the time determine whether a victim
may recover for his fall into a dark and unguarded basement stairway or elevator shaft.
Instances like those found in Chicago could be multiplied. There the city is liable for
negligently driven vehicles of the library, water, and garbage disposal departments, but
not for those concerned with health or police. Jurisdiction over streets by the city of
Chicago opens the way to recovery for injuries from street defects, but the immunity
rule applies when the Chicago Park District happens to have jurisdiction." Fuller &
Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HARV. L. REV. 437, 443 (1941). See
also Scasongood, Municipal Corporations: Objections to the Governmental or Proprie-
tary Test, 22 VA. L. REV. 910-17 (1936).
14. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
15. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
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States," and Rayonier v. United States.
The Dalelhite case was the first to articulate United States immunity
under the Tort Claims Act from liability for negligence in the perform-
ance of "governmental" activities. The salient facts of the case were:
At the close of World War II, cabinet-level decisions were made to ship
fertilizer to war-ravaged Europe. The fertilizer was manufactured from
ammonium nitrate, an ingredient of high explosives. Negligent decisions
of the method of its production and storage resulted in the fertilizer be-
ing highly explosive. Spontaneous combustion took place and subse -
quent explosions and fires practically destroyed the town of Texas City,
Texas."
The plaintiff, in conjunction with pleadings of negligence in the
planning and execution of the crash-program to manufacture and ship
fertilizer,'" alleged that the Coast Guard had been 'negligent in fighting
the fires from the explosions, and that such negligent fire-fighting was
an additional proximate cause of his injuries.
The Court rejected liability 9 arising out of the Coast Guard's negli-
gent fire fighting, holding that,
c *' . [The Act] did not change the normal rule
that an alleged failure or carelessness of public firemen
does not create private actionable rights. . .. [I]n fact,
if anything is doctrinally sanctified in the law of torts it is
the immunity of communities and other public bodies for
injuries due to fighting fire.""0
It would appear from these words that the Court assumed the
"governmental-proprietary" distinction to be of importance in constru-
ing the Tort Claims Act, at least in so far as the distinction bears upon
the activities of public firemen."
However, it is reasonably arguable that these few words in the
Dalehite opinion represent merely a superficially considered, incidental
16. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
17. Dalehite was a test case which represented over 300 separate personal and
property claims on the behalf of 8485 persons. The amount in issue from these claims
totaled two hundred million dollars. At least one writer is of the opinion that the
Court's decision could have been influenced by the magnitude of the potential liability.
James, Inroads on Old Tort Concepts (Part 2), 15 NACCA L. J. 281, 294 (1955).
18. The Court denied United States liability for negligence in planning and ex-
ecuting the fertilizer program on the basis of the "discretionary" exception to the Tort
Claims Act. See note 80 infra for the "discretionary" exception.
19. The Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, In re Texas City Dis-
aster Litigation, 197 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1952), which had reversed a judgment for
plaintiff in the district court.
20. 346 U.S. at 43-44.
21. See Mr. Justice Jackson's dissent, 346 U.S. 15, 47.
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holding of the Court. The Court had already disposed of the case on the
basis of the "discretionary" exception to the Tort Claims Act 2  and the
dominant theme throughout the entire majority opinion stressed this as-
pect of the case. 3 Moreover, the Court relied upon Feres v. United States
as its only authority under the Tort Claims Act to support its conclusion
that the United States was immune from suit for damages caused by
"governmental" activities.24 The Feres case must be regarded as some-
thing less than justifiably sound precedent to the effect that the
"governmental-proprietary" distinction controls interpretation of the
Tort Claims Act.
The Feres decision reviewed three cases involving servicemen who
were injured owing to the negligence of other members of the armed
forces.25 The issue involved was United States liability to servicemen
injured while on duty because of the negligence of other servicemen who
were carrying out official duties. The Court's conclusion was that there
was no governmental liability under the Tort Claims Act for injuries to
servicemen "when the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity
incident to service.
'2 6
Throughout the Feres opinion, the Court reasoned that the status of
the plaintiffs in relation to the army was the primary factor in denying
relief." The "governmental-proprietary" distinction was not mentioned
as such, although the Court did note that there was no analogous private
22. See note 80 infra.
23. Mr. Justice Reed, delivering the opinion of the Court, devoted twenty seven
pages to a detailed analysis of the factors pertaining to the "discretionary" exception, a
historical survey of the policy behind the adoption of the "discretionary" exception and
a careful espousal of the Court's interpretation and application of the "discretionary"
exception. The plaintiff's allegations of the Coast Guard's negligent fire fighting were
dismissed in one page, almost as an afterthought: ". . . as to the alleged failure in
fighting the fire, we think this too without the Act." 346 U.S. at 43. See note 17 supra
as to the possible influence of the large amount of damages sought.
24. "Our analysis of the question is determined by what was said in the Feres
case." 346 U.S. at 43.
25. Two incidents arose out of negligent medical treatment by army surgeons and
the third from an army barracks which burned because of a defective heating plant.
See note 15, szpra.
26. 340 U.S. at 146. "Without exception, the relationship of military personnel
to the Government has been governed exclusively by federal law. We do not think
that Congress, in drafting this Act, created a new cause of action dependent on local
law for service-connected injuries or death due to negligence." Ibid.
27. "We know of no American law which ever has permitted a soldier to recover
for negligence, against either his superior officer or the Government he is serving . . .
This Court . . . cannot escape . . . enactments by Congress which provide systems of
simple, certain, and uniform compensation for injuries or death of those in armed
services .... The compensation system . . . is not negligible or niggardly.... ".Id.
passim.
NOTES
tort liability.28  Thus, if one accepts the statv of the injured soldiers as
the controlling factor in the Feres decision, 29 it becomes difficult to de-
fend or justify the case as valid precedent for the Dalehite statement
about public firemen and the corresponding implication in the latter case
that immunity under the Tort Claims Act extends to "governmental"
activities as defined by the "governmental-proprietary" distinction.
Two years afterl the Dalehite decision the "governmental-proprietary"
distinction was again before the Court in Indian Towing Co. v. United
States. The Coast Guard maintained a lighthouse near a dangerou
coastline. Negligence in examining and repairing the electrical system
resulted in a failure of the light. No warning was issued to persons
navigating inthe area and plaintiff's tug went aground and was dam-
aged." Rejection of the "governmental-proprietary" distinction was
strongly phrased and the Court emphasized the "chaos" that would de-
velop should it be applied to the Tort Claims Act:
. . . [T]he Government in effect reads the statute as imposing
liability in the same manner as if it were a municipal corporation . .
it would thus push the courts into the 'non-govermental'-'governmental'
quagmire that has long plagued the law of municipal corporations . .
The Federal Tort Claims Act cuts the ground from under that doctrine;
it is not self-defeating by covertly embedding the casuistries of municipal
liability for torts."'" The Court recognized that the maintenance of navi-
gational aids such as lighthouses is a "governmental" function and that
28. "One obvious shortcoming in these claims is that plaintiffs can point to no
liability of a 'private individual' even remotely analogous to that which they are assert-
ing against the United States." Id. at 141.
29. The Court noted that Feres was a "'wholly different case'" from Brooks v.
United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949), which allowed recovery against the Government for
injuries sustained by a soldier in an off-duty status due to the negligence of a truck
driver in a military convoy. Similarly, there has been government liability where de-
pendents of servicemen, veterans and civilians employed by the armed services have
been negligently injured in military hospitals. Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th
Cir. 1956); Panella v. United States, 216 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1954); United States v.
Trubow, 214 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1954) ; United States v. Gray, 199 F.2d 239 (10th Cir.
1952) ; Costley v. United States, 181 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1950) ; Canon v. United States,
111 F. Supp. 162 (N.D. Cal. 1953); Grigalauskas v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 543
(D. Mass. 1951); Herring v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 69 (D. Colo. 1951); Dish-
man v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 567 (D. Md. 1950). Contra, O'Neil v. United States,
202 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1953); see Smart v. United States, 207 F.2d 841 (10th Cir.
1953) (recovery denied on grounds of "discretionary" exception); Dugan v. United
States, 147 F. Supp. 674 (D.D.C. 1956) (recovery denied on grounds of "discretionary"
exception). In light of these cases, allowing recovery against the Government for
injuries to civilians arising from the negligence of service personnel, it is difficult to
explain the Feres decision on any ground other than the military status of the plaintiffs.
30. Government counsel conceded that the "discretionary" exception was not in-
volved, 350 U.S. at 64, but insisted that there was "no liability for negligent perform-
ance of 'uniquely governmental functions."' Ibid.
31. Id. at 65.
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there is no analogous private activity; however, it hypothesized that
should Congress permit private persons to operate lighthouses they would
be liable for doing so negligently and denied that there need be identical
private activity in order to hold the United States liable under the Tort
Claims Act. 2 Although that portion of the Dalehite opinion which sug-
gests immunity for the negligent performance of "governmental" activi-
ties was not expressly overruled,"3 Indian Towing would seem to go far
toward eliminating the "governmental-proprietary" distinction from the
Tort Claims Act.34
The most recent and most significant Supreme Court decision con-
cerning the "governmental-proprietary" distinction was Rayonier v.
United States. The case involved negligence of the United States acting
in the capacity of a public fireman-the same function given immunity in
the Dalehite case. The Government owned forest land and had granted
a right of way to a railroad. Sparks from an engine ignited highly in-
flammable debris which the Government had negligently allowed to ac-
cumulate along the right of way. The United States Forest Service as-
sumed control over the fire fighting and had soon contained the con-
flagration to a 1600 acre area; however the Forest Service negligently
failed to completely extinguish the fire, leaving it to smolder for a period
32. "Moreover, if the United States were to permit the operation of private light-
houses-not at all inconceivable-the Government's basis of differentiation would be
gone and the negligence charged in this case would be actionable. Yet there would be
no change in the character of the Government's activity in the places where it operated
a lighthouse, and we would be attributing bizarre motives to Congress were we to hold
that it was predicating liability on such a completely fortuitous circumstance-the
presence of identical private activity." Id. at 66-67.
33. The Court noted that, "The differences between this case and Dalehite need
not be labored. The governing factors in Dalehite sufficiently emerge from the
opinion in that case." Id. at 69. This statement was amplified by a footnote: "The
Court in Dalehite disposed of a claim of liability for negligence in connection with fire
fighting by finding that 'there is no analogous liability * * *' in the law of torts. 346 U.S.
at page 44, 73 S. Ct. at page 972. But see Workman v. New York City, 179 U.S. 552,
21 S. Ct. 212, 45 L.Ed. 314." Ibid. n. 4. (Emphasis added.) Referral to the Workman
case in this context is significant because in that case recovery was allowed against the
City of New York under federal admiralty law for the negligent operation of a fire-
boat. This would indicate that had the matter of negligent government fire fighting
been before the Court, it would have imposed liability under the Tort Claims Act, not-
withstanding the Dalehite holding. Mr. Justice Reed, dissenting, recognized this pos-
sible ramification of the majority opinion. "Logically it may cover negligence in fire
fighting, although the Dalehite holding on that point is not overruled." Id. at 76.
34. The dissenting opinion noted this as an implication of the holding. ". . . Li-
ability of governments for the failure of lighthouse warning lights is as unknown to
tort law as, for example, liability for negligence in fire fighting excluded by the Dale-
hite ruling. Lighthouse keeping is as uniquely a governmental function as fire fight-
ing. . . . The over-all impression from the majority opinion is that it makes the Gov-
ernment liable under the Act for negligence in the conduct of 'any governmental activ-
ity on the operational level.' It seems broad enough to cover all so-called 'uniquely
governmental activities.'" Id. at 75-76.
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of five weeks. The fire broke out again, spread over an area of twenty
miles and damaged plaintiff's property.
Basically, two grounds of government negligence were alleged: al-
lowing inflammable debris to remain on its property in a place that con-
stituted a fire hazard under the laws of Washington, and failing to ex-
tinguish the fire when it was confined to the smaller area knowing that
conditions were such that it might break out again."
The district court dismissed the suit on the basis of the Dalehite
case"0 and was affirmed by the court of appeals.17  The Supreme Court
reversed, and, as in the Indian Towing case, rejected applicability of the
"governmental-proprietary" distinction to suits arising under the Tort
Claims Act, saying,
"We expressly decided in Indian Towing that the
United States liability is not restricted to the liability of a
municipal corporation or other public body and that an
injured party cannot be deprived of his rights under the
Act by resort to an alleged distinction, imported from the
law of municipal corporations. . . . and for obvious rea-
sons the United States cannot be equated with a munici-
pality, which conceivably might be rendered bankrupt if it
*were subject to liability for the negligence of its firemen."3
The case was remanded to determine whether the evidence "would
be sufficient to impose liability on a private person under the laws of the
State of Washington,""0 and the Court stressed that the measure of
liability was that applied to "private persons or corporations under simi-
lar circumstances. "40
Since few activities are more "governmental" in character than safe-
guarding navigation with lighthouses or protecting forested areas by
35. 352 U.S. at 317.
36. "My general impressions at this time about it are that in the absence of the
Dalehite case I would overrule the motion [to dismiss]. . . . If in all of the matters
referred to in the complaint he [the head forest ranger] was acting as a public fireman,
according to Dalehite there is no action. . . . I am obliged. . . . to sustain the motion
to dismiss, basing it entirely on the Dalehite case." Transcript of Record, pp. 37-41,
Rayonier v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
37. "We see no distinction between non-liability of the United States for negli-
gence of the Coast Guard in fighting fires and analogous negligent conduct by the
Forest Service." Rayonier Incorporated v. United States, 225 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.
1955).
38. 352 U.S. at 319-20.
39. Id. at 321.
40. "These provisions, [in the Tort Claims Act] given their plain natural mean-
ing, make the United States liable to petitioners for the Forest Service's negligence in
fighting the forest fire if, as alleged in the complaints, Washington law would impose
liability on private persons or corporations under similar circumstances." Id. at 318.
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means of firefighting, it is reasonably arguable that the facts of the
I dian. Towing and Rayoier cases support the conclusion that the
"governmental-proprietary" distinction is of no importance in assessing
United States liability under the Tort Claims Act and that the Dalehite
case, in so far as it accepted the distinction, has been overruled by the
Supreme Court.4
This conclusion would appear to be supported by numerous court of
appeals and district court decisions. These cases have arisen from the
negligence of federal employees while performing activities classified as
immune "governmental" functions under the "governmental-proprietary"
distinction as applied in most states. Thus, the Government has been
held accountable when employees in the capacity of policemen have negli-
gently performed their duties. For example, liability has been imposed
where a military policeman negligently injured the plaintiff while shoot-
ing at a man who was resisting arrest;42 and where an F.B.I. agent in
pursuit of a criminal negligently drove into the plaintiff.43 Likewise, the
Government has been held liable for its employees' negligent torts while
performing activities such as maintenance of public parks,44 maintenance
of public buildings such as post offices,45 marking the position of a
sunken vessel which posed a hazard to shipping," maintenance of buoys
41. The Court in Rayonier noted that it would not apply the distinction ". . be-
tween the Government's negligence when it acts in a 'proprietary' capacity and its negli-
gence when it acts -in a 'uniquely governmental' capacity .. " and that "to the extent
that there was anything to the contrary in the Dalehite case it was necessarily rejected
by Indian Towing." Id. at 319.
42. Cerri v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1948). "... To reason
that the United States cannot be here held liable because a municipality in California is
protected by the sovereignty of the state, is to ignore the plain meaning of the Federal
Tort Claims Act and to deny the object sought by Congress. . . . Certainly, the statute
itself makes no distinction between governmental activities of a sovereign nature and
those of a proprietary nature, nor does it include within the claims exempted . . . those
of this type." Id. at 833.
43. Sullivan v. United States, 129 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1955).
44. In Claypool v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1951), a park ranger
who knew that bears had recently attacked visitors to the park told the plaintiff that
they would not attack without provocation and that it would be safe to sleep out of
doors. The plaintiff followed the ranger's advice and was mauled by a bear. The
court rejected the "governmental-proprietary" distinction and assessed the United States
with liability for the ranger's negligence.
45. Jackson v. United States, 196 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1952) ; United States v. Hull,
195 F.2d 64 (1st Cir. 1952) ; Blaine v. United States, 102 F.Supp. 161 (E.D. Tenn. 1951).
46. Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951). "It is
suggested that it [the Tort Claims Act] was not intended to impose liability on the
United States for damages arising out of the exercise of what are essentially 'govern-
mental' functions as distinguished from those which might be carried on by private in-
dividuals, but we think there is no basis for such distinction." Id. at 635.
348
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delineating a navigation channel,4 operation of airport control towers," .
and performance of military activities.49
But even though the Indian Towing and Rayonier cases strongly
suggest that assessment of United States liability under the Tort Claims
Act has been considered apart from the "governmental-proprietary" dis-
tinction, a different conclusion may be drawn. It is possible to deny that
neither is a square holding on the question of application of the distinc-
tion to the Act. The decisions can be rationalized on the basis of sub-
stantive tort theories sufficient in themselves to have.imposed private
liability even though the general activity involved was not one in which
private persons ordinarily engage. Thus, in ITndian Towing the Court
likened the Government, in its capacity as a lighthouse operator, to a
volunteer. A volunteer is one who has no original tort duty of care
toward a particular person; however, once he initiates an act in behalf of
another person so as to induce reliance upon his performance, he must
then proceed with due care.5" If this decision can be said to rest upon
the ground of a breach of this substantive tort duty of a volunteer, " the
47. Cf. Russell, Poling & Co. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 890 (S.D. N.Y. 1956).
48. Air Transport Associates v. United States, 221 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1955);
United States v. Union Trust Company, 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955), aff'd per curiam,
350 U.S. 907 (1955). Both cases specifically considered and rejected application of the
"governmental-proprietary" distinction to the Tort Claims Act.
49. The cases involving negligence of members of the armed forces have disre-
garded the fact that private persons do not operate armies and have looked to the na-
ture of the specific activity in question. When the activity from which the negligence
arose is clearly similar to private activity, e.g., operation of vehicles, airplanes, swimming
pools, or activities on one's land giving rise to stream pollution, liability is imposed not-
withstanding the operation of the "governmental-proprietary" distinction in the various
states where the torts occurred. See United States v. Gaidys, 194 F.2d 762 (10th Cir.
1952) ; Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1948) ; Smith v. United States,
113 F. Supp. 131 (D. Del. 1953); Brewer v. United States, 108 F. Supp. 889 (M.D.
Ga. 1952); Parcell v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. W. Va. 1951); Brown v.
United States, 99 F. Supp. 685 (S.D. W. Va. 1951) ; Skeels v. United States, 72 F. Supp.
372 (W.D. La. 1947). Contra, Williams v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Fla.
1953), aff'd per curiamn, 218 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1955) (recovery denied on basis of "dis-
cretionary" exception).
50. ". . . [I]t is hornbook tort law that one who undertakes to warn the public
of danger and thereby induces reliance must perform his 'good Samaritan' task in a
careful manner.
"The Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse service. But once it exercised
its discretion to operate a light on Chandeleur Island and engendered reliance on the
guidance afforded by the light, it was obligated to use due care to make certain that the
light was kept in good working order; and, if the light did become extinguished, then
the Coast Guard was further obligated to use due care to discover this fact and to repair
the light or give warning that it was not functioning." 350 U.S. at 64-65, 69.
51 Under this same tort theory of the standard of care required of a volunteer the
Government was held liable for negligence of the Coast Guard in the rescue of a person
in peril at sea. United States v. Lawter, 219 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1955). Contra, Dough-
erty Co. v. United States, 207 F.2d 626 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 912 (1954) ;
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statements of the Court relating to rejection of the "governmental-
proprietary" distinction have less authoritative effect.
Likewise, in the Rayonier case the Government can be likened to a
landowner fighting a fire rather than a "public" fire fighter. The prop-
erty upon which the fire started was owned by the Government and plain-
tiff alleged that it had been negligently maintained. Washington statutes
make such conditions in forest lands a nuisance and require a landowner
on whose property a fire has started to take reasonable measures to ex-
tinguish it.52 The district court was of the opinion that these facts were
sufficient to show negligence on the part of a private land owner.53 Even
though the court of appeals had found as a matter of law that the United
States operations as a firefighter, rather than its operations as a land-
owner were the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages,54 Justice
Black, in remanding the case, mentioned that the stat law on the latter
point might have been incorrectly applied by the court of appeals.5 Such
facts provide a basis for rationalizing United States liability on a sub-
stantive tort theory applicable to private persons and thereby lessen the
necessity of explaining the decision on the grounds of liability for the
"governmental" activity of firefighting.
cf. Lacey v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 219 (D. Mass. 1951) (recovery denied because
rescue attempt did not deter others from participating).
52. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.04.380 (1952); WASH. REV. ConE § 76.04.450 (1952).
53. ". . . [I] f the Government does not have immunity by virtue of its capacity as
a public fireman, my opinion is there is a duty, there would be a duty to exercise rea-
sonable care in confining, controlling and extinguishing fire and consequently I would
be of the opinion that the action might be maintained, but for the public capacity of the
Forest Service in the matter of fighting fire." Transcript of Record, p. 41, Rayonier v.
United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
54. ". . . While much is alleged as to the origin of the fire, negligence of the
United States in failing to keep the railroad right of way clear of inflammable matter
as well as negligence in failing to control the early spread of the fire, we read the
amended complaint in its entirety as picturing a situation wherein the operation occurring
after the fire had spread to the 1600-acre plot is determinative of the liability of the
Government, if any. . . . [I]t was this recurrence of fire on the 1600-acre tract which
was the sole proximate cause of the injury to appellant's property and that risks, if any,
created by the acts or omissions of agencies of the Government prior to the containment
of the fire in the 1600-acre area had terminated." Rayonier Incorporated v. United
States, 225 F.2d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 1955).
55. ". . . While the Court of Appeals relied on state law to uphold the dismissal
of those allegations in the complaints which charged negligence for reasons other than
the Forest Service's carelessness in controlling the fire, we cannot say that court's in-
terpretation of Washington law was wholly free from its erroneous acceptance of the
statements -in Dalehite about public firemen. Furthermore it has been strongly con-
tended here that the Court of Appeals improperly interpreted certain allegations in the
complaints and as a result of such misinterpretation incorrectly applied Washington
law. . . . In view of the circumstances, we think it proper to vacate both judgments in
their entirety so that the District Court may consider the complaints anew . . . wholly
free to determine their sufficiency on the basis of whether . . . [they] would be suf-
ficient to impose liability on a private person under the laws of the State of Washing-
ton." 352 U.S. at 320-21.
NOTES
The majority of lower federal court decisions likewise can be ex-
plained." Thus, for example, liability for negligent maintenance of
parks and public buildings is readily rationalized by the duties of private
landowners to invitees or licensees and the duties owed by a volunteer
can be used as'the basis of liability for negligently placing warning sig-
nals near sunken vessels and negligently marking navigation channels.57
But even though Indian Towing, Rayonier and the lower federal
court cases are capable of being rationalized on the ground of substantive
tort doctrines sufficient in themselves to impose private liability, and the
,value of such opinions as direct renunciations of the "governmental-
proprietary" distinction may therefore be questioned, nevertheless, it
would seem more reasonable to argue that the Supreme Court has re-
nounced the distinction. These cases are not reconcilable with the subtle
intricacies of the "governmental-proprietary" distinction as it is utilized
in state courts.5" To assert that these cases avoid a holding on the
"governmental-proprietary" distinction because one aspect of the "govern-
mental" activity involved is analogous to a specific, actionable private
activity, overlooks the fact that in municipal corporation tort law the dis-
tinction frequently provides immunity notwithstanding the presence of
identical private activity."
Moreover, even if the cases are capable of being distinguished, an
examination of the considerations which originally prompted the courts
56. However, it is difficult to explain the cases involving torts of police officers on
the grounds of private tort liability in that private persons, under circumstances other
than extraordinary, are not authorized to perform such activities. See notes 42 and 43
supra. Although an individual would be liable for negligently firing a gun into a crowd
of people or negligently driving an automobile, it is unrealistic to distill these specific
acts from the dominant element that they were performed in the course of the appre-
hension of criminals. Perhaps these cases provide the strongest argument that the
"governmental-proprietary" distniction is not material to the interpretation of the Tort
Claims Act.
57. The cases involving negligent operation of airport control towers have arisen
from large, complex and expensive operations. Because of the substantial capital in-
vestment involved plus the small profit return, such undertakings are operated by gov-
ernment bodies as publically owned, public utilities. However, private persons do op-
erate airports, though they are smaller in extent, and private liabilities in this field may
be used as the basis for government liability under the Tort Claims Act. See note 49
supra for the basis of liability for negligence arising out of military activities.
58. Tort Claims Act cases arising out of negligence in the operation of govern-
ment hospitals have imposed liability even though the state law in the states where the
hospitals are located directs a contrary result through the "governmental-proprietary"
distinction. E.g., compare Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956), with
Gartman v. City of McAllen, 130 Tex. 237, 107 S.W.2d 897 (1937).
59. See, e.g., Bouchard v. Auburn, 133 Me. 439, 179 Atl. 718 (1935) (negligent re-
moval of rotten tree limb which overhung sidewalk and street in heavily populated part
of city) ; Board of Education of the School District of the City of Cincinnati v. Mc-
Henry, 106 Ohio St. 357, 140 N.E. 169 (1922) (dentist employed by school board negli-
gently broke jaw of pupil in the public school).
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to develop the "governmental-proprietary" distinction, the rationaliza-
tions which have been employed to justify its continuance, and the re-
sults obtained under the application of the distinction lead to the con-
clusion that there are no valid policy considerations supporting utiliza-
tion of the distinction in interpreting the Tort Claims Act.
Originally the distinction was based upon three policy considera-
tions: Recognition of actions arising from "governmental" acts would
produce an infinity of suits; there was no precedent for such a suit; and
there was no corporate fund out of which to pay the damages.6" These
objections to allowing a suit against a unit of government, while possibly
valid one hundred and fifty years ago, would seem to lack logical appeal
in modern tort law. 61
The arguments employed to justify continued utilization of the
''governmental-proprietary" distinction after its inception have been
many and varied. The most widely adopted rationalizations for urging
continuance of the distinction amount to no more than variations of the
"King Can Do No Wrong" concept under which the state is immune
from suit.62 The dominant theme underlying these reasons is that since
the municipality is created under the egis of the immune state, it is but an
auxiliary of the state and is thus immune from suit for those activities
which it performs for the benefit of the state, i.e., "governmental" activi-
ties.6" Therefore, the source of the immunity provided to the munici-
pality by the "governmental-proprietary" distinction is the sovereign im-
munity of the state. Under such a theory, if the state should abandon its
immunity, there would be no logical basis upon which the courts could
continue to protect the municipality from liability. There is no valid
reason for United States waiver of sovereign immunity under the Tort
Claims Act to be mitigated by the sovereign immunities of the states
60. The "governmental-proprietary" distinction was first utilized in Great Britain
in 1798. Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1798). It was
adopted in the United States in New York in 1842. Bailey v. City of New York, 3 Hill
531 (N.Y. 1842).
61. The states that have waived their sovereign immunity and abolished the
"governmental-proprietary" distinction have not experienced over-crowded court dockets
from the recognition of such actions. The modern law of negligence is noted for its
flexibility and adaptability to unique situations; it has not been immobilized by a lack
of precedent when called upon to determine the rights of parties involved in a novel
dispute. Congress has regularly appropriated funds in order to pay damages assessed
against the United States under the Tort Claims Act.
62. PRossER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 109, p. 770 (2d ed. 1955). The "King Can Do
No Wrong" concept provided immunity to the United States Government from tort
claims prior to adoption of the Tort Claims Act in 1946. See, e.g., United States v.
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941).
63. Warp, The Law and Administration of Municipal Tort Liability, 28 VA. L. REv.
360, 362 (1942).
NOTES
through their "govefnmental-proprietary" distinction. Should the dis-
tinction be adopted, the federal government would be in the peculiar po-
sition of both waiving its immunity from suit and at the same time re-
taining part of such immunity as a derivative from state immunities.
Another argument in support of the "governmental-proprietary" dis-
tinction is that municipalities cannot afford to properly perform their
functions if they are made liable for the torts of their employees.64 The
states that have waived their sovereign immunity have not experienced
this difficulty.65 Moreover, imposition of liability in the performance of
"proprietary" functions such as water and light plants which often pose
greater risks and involve greater potential liabilities than many "govern-
mental" activities apparently has not hampered these functions. But
even assuming that this argument is valid in applying the distinction to
municipalities, it can hardly be said to be valid in relation to the federal
government. It is doubtful if any federal activity would be terminated
on the basis of fear that an occasional tort by an employee would result
in a damage suit against the United States.6"
In most states the minute distinctions utilized in the classification of
activities as either "governmental" or "proprietary" lack logical appeal.6"
The results of similar cases from one jurisdiction to another are anything
but uniform.6"
Under the Tort Claims Act, the Government is to be liable, "... in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission oc-
64. Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L. J. 129, 132-33 (1924).
65. MacDonald, The Administration of a Tort Liability Law in New York, 9 LAw
& CONTE11P. PROB. 262 (1942) ; David & French, Public Tort Liability Administration:
Organization, Methods, and Expense, 9 id. at 348; Warp, Tort Liability Problems of
Small Municipalities, 9 id. at 363.
66. "There is one suggestion made upon argument which must be rejected with
scorn. It is said that, if the Government is held to responsibility for breaks in the canals
and dams whichit has constructed, it will effectually dampen the ardor of the bureaus
for constructing other works. This suggestion is amoral at least." Ure v. United
States, 93 F. Supp. 779, 792 (D. Ore. 1950), aff'd, 193 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1951).
67. "It is when we come to the municipal corporation as an agency of the public
power that we find the greatest confusion to prevail, not only as to the substantive
liability or immuniy of the corporation in tort, but as to the grounds upon which the
liability or immunity, as the case may be, properly rests. In few, if any, branches of
the law have the courts labored more abjectly under the supposed inexorable domination
of formulas, phrases and terminology, with the result that facts have often been tor-
tured into the framework of a formula, lacking in many cases any sound basis of rea-
son or policy." Borchard, supra note 64 at 129. See note 13 supra.
68. "Not all courts, however, are equally submissive to the commands of a ritual;
so that we find the utmost confusion among the courts in the attempt to classify par-
ticular acts of state agents as governmental or corporate. Disagreement among the
courts as to many customary municipal acts and functions may almost be said to be more
common than agreement and the elaboration of the varying justifications for their
classification is even less satisfying to any demand for principle in the law." Bor-
chard, supra note 64 at 129.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
curred. "69 Thus the effect of adoption of the "governmental-
proprietary" distinction, in addition to immunity for most sovereign ac-
tivities, would be a widespread variance in the application of the Tort
Claims Act to similar cases arising in different states and would impose
upon the Federal Courts a burden of administering an extremely com-
plicated and inconsistent body of law.7" Although it is impossible to
ascertain any specific congressional intent as to the interpretation of the
Tort Claims Act,71 it is highly doubtful that Congress intended to inject
the distinction into the Act in view of the confusion and uncertainty that
its utilization would promote."2
If the "governmental-proprietary" distinction were to be resolutely
applied to cases arising under the Tort Claims Act, United States im-
munity would prevail in many areas of activity where, under the present
interpretation of the Act, there is now liability." Regardless of the un-
certainty of congressional intent as to the interpretation of specific pro-
visions in the Tort Claims Act, it is clear that Congress meant to allevi-
ate as much as possible the overwhelming burden of considering private
bills for the relief of individual tort claims.74 Such a result would not
be obtained through adoption of the "governmental-proprietary" dis-
tinction since it would increase to a large extent the number of activities
without the purview of the Tort Claims Act.
As stated previously, the case law indicates that the distinction has
not been utilized. Neither have the courts evaluated United States lia-
bility under the Act strictly on the basis of the tort law applicable to
natural persons or private corporations."5 Although liability of the
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1952).
70. In the Inzdian Towing case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter characterized the law of
municipal corporations as a "quagmire" and noted that "chaos" would develop in the
courts if the distinction should be applied to the Tort Claims Act. 350 U.S. at 65.
71. See note 9 supra.
72. An inference can be drawn from the silence of Congress on the question
coupled with the twelve express exceptions to the waiver of United States immunity
that were delineated in the Act (28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1952)). Application of the rule of
construction, expressio imius est exclusio alterhes, plus Supreme Court rulings that the
Act is to be liberally construed lend credence to the conclusion that the "governmental-
proprietary" distinction should not be applied to cases arising under the Tort Claims Act.
73. For example, the Government would be immune from suits arising out of the
negligence of policemen, firemen, post office employees, street cleaners, and the negli-
gent operation of parks and federal courthouses. Such results are not consistent with
the modern trend of minimizing individual losses by expanding tort remedies available
to injured parties through both the courts and the legislature.
74. Jackson, The Tort Clains Act-The Federal Governnent Assumes Liability in
Tort, 27 NEa. L. REv. 30, 31 (1947). See note 9 supra.
75. The operation of hospitals is not a uniquely "governmental" activity. Many
private individuals and corporations are engaged in this pursuit. However, in most
states liability of a private hospital is contingent upon whether the service rendered is
charitable or for profit. As indicative of the proposition that the courts have not entirely
NOTES
Government under the Tort Claims Act is to be adjudged "in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual," 6 the absence of
actual private activity corresponding to the activity pursued. by the
Government with the consequential absence of private tort law in such
areas has provided no immunity to the United States."' There is no pri-
vate tort law in the areas of uniquely "governmental" activity only be-
cause private persons have not engaged in such activities. Therefore,
there are no private duties or standards of care that have developed
against which the conduct of the United States can be measured to de-
termine its liability. However, this lack of corresponding private lia-
bility has not been an insurmountable obstacle. When confronted with
such situations the courts have indicated a judicial willingness to hy-
pothesize in regard to the duties and liabilities of private persons sholdd
they undertake such activities, and have assessed United States liability
under the Act accordingly. Factually, the extent of this hypothesization
seems to be limited by whether it is reasonably conceivable that a private
person might undertake a particular activity. Liability is imposed if pri-
vate activity, corresponding to that in which the Government was en-
gaged, is not reasonably inconceivable." But if the probability of private
activity is remote, United States immunity under the Tort Claims Act
accepted the tort law applicable to "private persons" in construing the Tort Claims Act,
it should be noted that although the "Charitable Institution" theory determines the li-
ability of negligently operated private hospitals, this theory has not affected determina-
tion of cases under the Act arising from negligently operated government hospitals.
Dishman v. United States, 93 F.Supp. 567 (D. Md. 1950). See Grigalauskas v. United
States, 103 F.Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1951) where the court went to great lengths to find
that a serviceman's dependent receiving care in an army hospital is not a recipient of
charity because the purpose of the hospital is ". . . the building and preservation of
health and morale in the armed forces." Id. at 551.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1952).
77. Under the Tort Claims Act the Government is to be liable "... in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred ... " 28 U.S.C. §
1346(b) (1952). Because of the lack of common law liability of private persons in
areas of uniquely "governmental" activity there is no "law of the place" which the courts
can utilize to determine the liability of the Government under the Tort Claims Act.
Consequently, the federal courts have been developing what appears to be a "common
law" doctrine for the law of torts unique to the United States Judiciary which is not
derivative from the torts common law of the several states. Compare the frequently
repeated proposition that "there is no federal general common law" as expressed in
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Growth of a "federal common law"
has not been confined to the law of torts. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
78. ". . . it is hard to think of any governmental activity on the 'operational level,'
our present concern, which is 'uniquely governmental,' in the sense that its kind has not
at one time or another been, or could not conceivably be, privately performed." Indian
Towing v. United States, 350 U.S. at 68. See, e.g., United States v. Union Trust Com-
pany, 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955). aff'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 907 (1955).
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prevails."9 Thus, the courts appear to have adopted a "middle ground"
between the extremes of either the literal standard of tort law of private
persons or the standard of the "governmental-proprietary" distinction in
applying the Tort Claims Act provisions to United States negligence in
fields of uniquely "governmental" activities.
However, liability under the Tort Claims Act does not extend to the
full breadth of "governmental" activities performed by the federal
government. It is easily recognizable that immunity is required in cer-
tain fields so that the United States will not be hampered from effec-
tively administering important programs for the furtherance of the pub-
lic welfare. The "discretionary" exception in the Tort Claims Act,"0 as
an alternative to the "governmental-proprietary" distinction, provides a
sufficient safety valve so as to immunize the United States from liabili-
ties to which it should not be held. The cases which have afforded im-
munity to the Government for negligent performance of uniquely "gov-
ernmental" activities have utilized the "discretionary" exception to the
Tort Claims Act.8 1 Most of the activities protected by the "discretionary"
exception involve programs instituted by high-level policy decisions
which have far-reaching economic, military or political consequences.82
Thus, there has been immunity in situations such as terminating price
control regulations causing plaintiff to lose money on a contract,83 fail-
ing to operate a coal mine after it had been seized during a national
emergency, 4 acting in pursuance of plans to control floods 5 and improve
79. Thus, there is immunity when persons confined in penal institutions are negli-
gently injured: Morton v. United States, 228 F.2d 431 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 975 (1956) ; Van Zuch v. United States, 118 F.Supp. 468 (E.D. N.Y. 1954) ;
Shew v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 1 (M.D. N.C. 1953); Sigmon v. United States,
110 F. Supp. 906 (W.D. Va. 1953). See also National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210
F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 967 (1954) (semble) (negligent weather
forecasts made by the United States Weather Bureau).
80. "The provisions of this . . . title shall not apply to-(a) Any claim based
upon . . . the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discre-
tionary function or duty on the part of a Federal agency or an employee of the Govern-
ment, whether or not the discretion involved be abused." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1952).
For a perceptive study of the "discretionary" exception, see Peck, The Federal Tort
Claims Act-A Proposed Construction of the Discretionary Function Exception, 31
WAs H. L. REv. 207 (1956).
81. The Dalehite case is the leading authority for the application of the "discre-
tionary" exception. See notes 17 and 18 supra.
82. Congressional reports indicate that the "discretionary" exception was intended
to prevent actions arising out of such activities. The reports mentioned suits against
regulatory agencies like the Federal Trade Commission and the Securities and Exchange
Commission and claims against the Government arising from projects designed to im-
prove flood control and navigation. H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945)
S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1946).
83. Jones v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 980 (S.D. Iowa 1949).
84. Old King Coal Co. v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 124 (S.D. Iowa 1949).
85. E.g., Olson v. United States, 93 F.Supp. 150 (D. N.D. 1950).
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navigability of streams,"0 determining that migratory birds could not be
hunted-the birds had eaten plaintiff's grain from a field adjoining the
game preserve, 7 and making decisions to test secret military weapons."8
These functions are of such a nature that their efficient and eco-
nomical management can only be undertaken by the Government. Carry-
ing out such functions affects many persons, and massive and widespread
damage claims could arise from a single government act. 9 Immunity is
required for these types of activity if they are to be administered effec-
tively, for without it a government employee or official might be hesitant
to exercise his authorized discretion out of fear of reprisal. Judicial re-
view of the wisdom of this class of activities would involve political
considerations that are within the province of the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches of government."
The term "discretionary" as it is used in the Tort Claims Act is no
innovation in the field of public law. For many years the federal courts
had worked with the interpretation of "discretionary" in determining
when official conduct involves discretion which may be exercised without
giving rise to liability of government officers. Historically, the phrase,
"discretionary function or duty" had acquired a definitive meaning in
areas closely related to that covered by the Tort Claims Act, such as
whether mandamus or injunction will issue to compel action by a govern-
ment officer,9 and the determination of personal liability of govern-
ment officers in damage suits.92 It appears that Congress deliberately
used the phrase in the Act with the intention that it should have the same
meaning afforded by the courts in suits against government officials.93
There is even reason to suggest that had the "discretionary" exception
86. E.g., Coates v. United States, 181 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950).
87. Sickman v. United States, 184 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1950).
88. Williams v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Fla. 1953), aff'd per curiam,
218 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Bartholomae Corporation v. United States, 135 F.Supp.
651 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (atomic weapons testing). But if the damage is caused by minis-
terial negligence during the course of executing the program as distinguished from the
discretionary decision to initiate the program, liability is imposed. Bulloch v. United
States, 133 F. Supp. 885 (D. Utah 1955) (atomic weapons testing).
89. This was the situation -in the Texas City disaster which gave rise to the Dale:
hite case. See note 17 supra.
90. For an excellent analysis of the policy considerations see, Coates v. United
States, 181 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950). "Manifestly the project [Missouri River flood
and navigation control] embodies decisions and the exercise of discretion and discretion-
ary functions of the highest order by both the legislative and executive branches of the
government and the formulation, expression and application of governmental policy en-
tirely beyond any power of interference by the judicial branch." Id. at 817.
91. E.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See Sherwood,
Mandamus to Review State Administrative Action, 45 MicH. L. Rav. 123, 139 (1946).
92. E.g., Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U. S.
949 (1950). See, PROSSER, TnE LAW oF TORTS § 109, at 780-84 (2d ed. 1955).
93. Coates v. United States, 181 F.2d 816, 818 (8th Cir. 1950).
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been excluded from the Act, it nevertheless would have been utilized by
the courts to provide government immunity in certain instances."4
Of the cases that have arisen involving "discretionary" activities,
the results have often been phrased in terms of the activity being "gov-
ernmental" or "sovereign."" 5  It appears that the word "governmental"
retains its importance under the Tort Claims Act only in so far as it may
be useful to describe the consequence of United States immunity for "dis-
cretionary" activities as contrasted with its use as one of the categories in
the "governmental-proprietary" distinction. The "discretionary" excep-
tion in the Tort Claims Act provides the immunity from tort liability
necessary to ensure adequate performance of functions essential to the
public welfare free from the possibility of damage claims which if pres-
ent might result in timid, hesitant administration of public programs. At
the same time utilization of the "discretionary" exception does not result
in unnecessary immunities at the operational level of government activity
such as would necessarily occur should the "governmental-proprietary"
distinction be used.
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS: THE INTERRELATION OF
JURISDICTION AND QUALIFICATION
There are two bases of personal jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions: a corporation may give actual consent to judicial jurisdiction mani-
fested normally by compliance with a state foreign corporation qualifica-
tion act;' and secondly, a corporation, even though it has not qualified,
by engaging in sufficient activity within the state to establish a basis for
jurisdiction other than actual consent is subject to judicial jurisdiction.2
Under the doctrine of International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington? the
latter basis has undergone substantial change in recent years. The instant
inquiry involves an examination of the interrelation of these two bases
and the impact of International Shoe thereon with particular emphasis on
94. This has occurred under the statutory waiver of immunity from damages aris-
ing out of activities of the T.V.A. Although the waiver does not mention any excep-
tions it has been interpreted by the courts so as to exclude liability for discretionary
functions. See Grant v. T.V.A., 49 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Tenn. 1942) ; Pacific National
Fire Ins. v. T.V.A., 89 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Va. 1949).
95. E.g., Coates v. United States, 181 F.2d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 1950) ; Williams v.
United States, 115 F. Supp. 386, 388 (N.D. Fla. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 218 F.2d 473
(5th Cir. 1955) ; North v. United States, 94 F. Supp. 824, 828 (D. Utah 1950).
1. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 90, 91 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956).
2. Id. at §§ 91a, 92.
3. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
